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INTRODUCTION 
This article traces the history of the fiscal “stability” features of 
the Eurozone, following the European Union’s movement from a firm 
‘no bailout’ policy, through the eventual financial rescue of several 
troubled Eurozone member states during the Euro crisis,1 and then on 
to the 2012 establishment of the European Stability Mechanism 
(“ESM”).2 
It will also describe the parallel history of the European Union’s 
Stability and Growth Pact (“SGP”), 3  from its origins in the 
                                                                                                                                     
* Professor of Law and Jacob Becker Fellow, Loyola Law School – Los Angeles. Kevin 
Favro and Elisheva Rafael provided valued research assistance. 
1.  For an overview of the Euro crisis, see generally Philip R. Lane, The European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis, 26(3) J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 49 (2012). 
2.  The European Stability Mechanism, established in 2012 in the aftermath of the Euro 
crisis, is a permanent facility for financial assistance to Eurozone members. 
3.  For an overview of the history of the Stability and Growth Pact through its 2005 
reforms, as well as an argument that economic growth concerns should be given more 
primacy, see generally Roger J. Goebel, Economic Governance in the European Union: 
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convergence criteria stipulated by the Maastricht Treaty4 in the run-up 
to the launch of the Euro, to the first generation of the SGP through 
its breakdown and subsequent 2005 reforms, and onto the post-crisis 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance (“Fiscal 
Compact”).5 
These two lines of development represent the European Union’s 
fiscal stability apparatus. The SGP, as reformed and enhanced by the 
Fiscal Compact, continues to address fiscal stability in ordinary times, 
which includes both the times of economic expansion and the periods 
of contraction that are experienced through the business cycle. The 
SGP system operates both ex ante, in reviewing member state 
proposed budgets, and ex post, where it creates the possibility of the 
imposition of sanctions on member states that persistently run 
excessive budgetary deficits. 
The European Stability Mechanism has been set up to address a 
return of member state fiscal catastrophe. The ESM will serve to 
bailout an imperiled Eurozone member state, notwithstanding the 
continued presence of a ‘no bailout’ provision in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).6 An intergovernmental 
treaty among the Eurozone member states formally established the 
ESM.7 Participation by the Eurozone member states in this treaty, in 
turn, was authorized by an amendment to the TFEU8 that had been 
                                                                                                                                     
Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth in the Stability and Growth Pact?, 31 
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1266 (2008) [hereinafter Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh 
Economic Growth]. 
4.  See Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. C. 191/1 
[hereinafter Maastricht TEU]. The Treaty set out four convergence criteria for member states 
to qualify to adopt the Euro: low inflation rate, low long-term interest rates, stable exchange 
rates, and avoidance of excessive budget deficits. See generally Roger J. Goebel, European 
Economic and Monetary Union: Will the EMU Ever Fly?, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249 (1998). 
5.  See generally See European Commission Press Release D/12/2, Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, Feb. 1, 2012, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-12-2_en.htm [hereinafter Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination, and Governance]. 
6.  See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 125, 2012 O.J. C. 326/47 [hereinafter TFEU]. The provision provides that neither the EU 
nor any member state “shall be liable for or assume the commitments of . . . any member state 
. . . .” 
7.  See generally Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Feb. 2, 2012, 
Eur. Comm’n DOC/12/3. 
8.  See id. at art. 136(3). TFEU Article 136(3) now provides: “The Member States 
whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable 
to safeguard the stability of the eruo area as a whole. The granting of any required financial 
assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality.” 
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adopted through the ‘simplified revision procedure.’9  The ESM is 
intended to act as a “firewall” for the Eurozone. 
The establishment of the ESM in the aftermath of the Euro crisis 
represents the delayed recognition that a Eurozone member state may 
indeed fail - and that the common interest of the Eurozone (if not that 
of the entire European Union) may justify financial intervention. 
Effectively, the ESM is a vehicle for a bailout. Like many “crisis” 
facilities,10 the ESM may never be called on. The ESM’s presence 
may simply serve to calm financial markets. Still, recent experience 
has demonstrated that easy access to Euro borrowings might tempt 
Eurozone member states into fiscal irresponsibility and trap them into 
economic straits from which they could not emerge on their own 
power, thereby threatening the entire Eurozone project. 
The very presence of the ESM, even should it never be drawn 
on, admits the possibility of a future bailout. Maintaining the ESM in 
the meantime is costly, though to a varying degree beneficial to 
certain member states – if for no other reason than driving down their 
Euro-denominated borrowing costs. The ESM more than mutualizes 
sovereign default risk; it effects a present transfer from certain states 
to others. It is, functionally, an element of fiscal policy at the intra-EU 
level. 
This brief history of the ESM will be, in design, a backward 
look, as essentially most histories are. The story will end, for the 
moment, with the 2012 establishment of the ESM and the lingering 
workout of the Euro crisis that had been ignited by the 2009 post-
election revelations of the massive understatement of Greece’s 
budgetary shortfalls.11 It will proceed chronologically, beginning with 
the stipulation of the convergence criteria that had to be satisfied 
before a member state could be admitted to Stage III of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (“EMU”) called for by the Treaty of 
Maastricht.12  Maastricht addressed the ‘deficit bias’ that had been 
observable in several EU member states embarking on the Euro 
launch; it imposed a convergence criterion for annual budget deficits 
                                                                                                                                     
9 .  See id. at Part III. The “simplified revision procedure” is made available for 
amendments to Part Three of the TFEU. 
10.  For a discussion of ‘crisis containment’ international financial law, see generally 
Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051 (2009). 
11.  See Tayyab Mahmud, Is it Greek or déjà vu all over again?: Neoliberalism and 
Winners and Losers of International Debt Crises, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 629, 639 (2010-11). 
12.  See supra note 4. 
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of a maximum of 3% of GDP. Overall national indebtedness was to 
be reduced so as to approach 60% of GDP as a condition for 
admission to the Euro. 
The Maastricht convergence criteria were given a kind of 
permanency in the first Stability and Growth Pact adopted in 1997.13 
The 3% annual budget deficit and 60% overall debt targets were 
carried over from the Maastricht convergence test. 14  Eurozone 
member states were subjected to fairly rigid budgetary constraints on 
a continuing basis. Such strong fiscal discipline, given the retention of 
fiscal competence by the Eurozone member states, was thought to be 
necessary to enhance the credibility of the single monetary policy.15 
The initial Stability and Growth Pact proved unworkable16 and 
provoked a political (and constitutional) crisis;17 it was reformed in 
2005.18 A relatively stable few years followed,19 before Europe was 
drawn into the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. But it was the 
October 2009 Greek revelation that suddenly brought the risk of a 
Eurozone member state sovereign default to the forefront of the 
                                                                                                                                     
13.  The Council adopted two regulations in June 1997 in order to implement the SGP: 
the Multilateral Surveillance Regulation and the Excessive Debt Regulation. See Roger 
Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth, supra note 3 at 1269. See also 
Council Regulation No. 1466/97, O.J. C 236/1 (Aug. 2, 1997); Council Regulation No. 
1467/97, O.J. C 236/3 (Aug. 2, 1997). 
14.  There was no stipulation of the targets for aggregate budget deficits or aggregate 
sovereign debt. As these are likely less volatile than the constituent national statistics, and as 
they cannot be directly controlled, there may be little technical advantage that these be 
established. 
15.  See Marco Buti & Bertrand Martinot, Open Issues on the Implementation of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, 174 NAT’L INST. ECON. REV. 92 (2000) (“The SGP is probably the 
most stringent ‘commitment technology’ ever adopted by a group of governments in an 
attempt to establish and maintain sound public finances.”) 
16.  Economic conditions in Europe began to decline in 2002, and unemployment grew 
to over 10%. See Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth, supra note 3, at 
1319-20. 
17.  Both France and Germany were projected to run budget deficits exceeding the 3 
percent SGP limits in 2003. See Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth, 
supra note 3, at 1320-1323. The Commission had recommended the initiation of sanctions, but 
France and Germany were able to wield political support in the Council to block the process. 
The Commission sued the Council, seeking to annul its decision not to adopt the 
recommendations of the Commission. See Commission v. Council, Case C-27/04, [2004] 
E.C.R. I-6649. See generally Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth, 
supra note 3, at 1329-1340. 
18.  See R. Morris, H. Ongena and L. Schuknecht, The Reform and Implementation of 
the Stability and Growth Pact, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 47, June 
2006. 
19.  See generally Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth, supra 
note 3, at 1318-1319. 
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awareness of the financial markets.20 This jangling of the nerves of 
the financial markets played out on top of an already challenged 
economic picture in many Eurozone member states, as bust seemed to 
have replaced boom for the long haul. 
The very real confrontation with the prospect of a sovereign 
default within the Eurozone demonstrated that the prophylactic 
approach relying on the budgetary limits set out in both the initial and 
reformed Stability and Growth Pacts had failed. The SGP did not 
prevent Greece and other Eurozone member states from approaching 
the brink of default. Moreover, once the prospect of a Eurozone 
member state default arose, there was little to no assurance of a 
credible rescue. Working without a net - the ‘no bailout’ principle - 
demonstrated to have generated more collective harm than good. 
The various Eurozone bailouts were built on a series of ad hoc 
undertakings. They were, so it now seems, adequate to rescue the 
afflicted member states. The ESM has now made a Eurozone bailout 
facility a permanent feature of the Economic and Monetary Union. 
Collective Eurozone intervention in response to a prospective 
sovereign default has moved from the unimaginable to the 
anticipated. 
It has been frequently remarked that the Economic and Monetary 
Union is misnamed.21 The EMU does, of course, establish a monetary 
union among the participating Eurozone member states – and a 
supreme, independent European Central Bank is charged with the 
conduct of Eurozone monetary policy.22 But a true economic union 
remains far from realization; notwithstanding the considerable 
progress achieved toward commercial integration within the European 
Union, fiscal policies (taxation, spending, pensions, and the like) 
continue to be jealously guarded sovereign prerogatives. Indeed, there 
are only minimal efforts at harmonization of these fiscal policies, 
                                                                                                                                     
20.  See Mahmud, supra note 11. 
21.  Roger Goebel admits the existence of the monetary union, but writes “the so-called 
economic union is not really a union.” Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic 
Growth, supra note 3, at 1272. 
22.  Formally, the establishment of the EMU constitutes a transfer of monetary authority 
from the Eurozone member states to the ECB. See id. at 1267. It should be remembered that 
the adoption of the Euro followed a long period of exchange rate coordination, where 
functionally most EU member states ceded monetary control to Germany’s Bundesbank. See 
GOEBEL, FOX, BERMANN, ATIK, EMMERT & GERARD, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 4TH (2015) at 
1223-1232. 
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such as the budgetary and overall debt strictures of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
It is awkward, to put it mildly, to have a common currency 
throughout a zone where disparate national macroeconomic policies 
are in play. And the simple fact remains that real economic 
convergence is a far-off scenario in the Eurozone; there are wild 
differences in productivity, employment, and workplace 
demographics among the member states. As it seems clear now, the 
original EMU design was destined to shake itself apart sooner or later. 
The structural disparities among the Eurozone member states are 
profound. Greece demonstrated some of the wildest political 
expectations, which inflamed German sensibilities. A heady mix of 
vast public employment, early retirement ages, and a demonstrable 
inability (or unwillingness) to collect taxes as due seemed to make 
budget shortfalls inevitable. Were Greece running the drachma, the 
result of such profligacy (and I use this term ironically) would have 
been domestic inflation and a loss of exchange value. But Greece now 
had the Euro as its domestic currency, so these automatic adjustments 
did not take place. And while it is true that the Euro is a commonly 
shared domestic currency, it is, from the budget perspective of any 
particular Eurozone member state, an external currency. The necessity 
of budget balance cannot be escaped in the long run, absent default or 
other form of, shall we say, external involuntary transfer. Spain, 
Ireland, Portugal, Italy - all have significant fiscal structures that 
cannot, as a political reality, be easily changed. And having to meet 
domestic social obligations with hard Euros is a considerable 
hardship. 
What then were the designers of the EMU thinking? They 
clearly understood that imposing a common currency on a mix of 
countries following very different macroeconomic courses was 
unstable at best. They may have simply ignored the problem, hoping 
(as optimists) that deeper fiscal integration would follow before a 
crisis would erupt. Or - more darkly - they may have recognized that 
it would take a crisis, an inevitable crisis, to goad the Eurozone into 
the deeper fiscal integration they viewed as necessary to complete the 
European project. It is hard to imagine that any serious economic (or 
political) thinker would have believed the simple-minded, somewhat 
arbitrary, and one-sized budgetary and indebtedness undertakings set 
out in the Stability and Growth Pact would, by themselves, be 
adequate to effectively coordinate Eurozone member state fiscal 
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policies in a way that would support a strong and stable Euro - 
without the periodic and continuing need for large compensating 
transfer payments from some member states to others. 
I. NO BAILOUTS AND THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT 
It is true, of course, that a ‘no bailout’ principle has been 
incorporated into EU law from the Maastricht Treaty. This language 
was scrutinized in the CJEU’s 2012 Pringle decision, which 
challenged the compatibility of the ESM with EU norms.23 Yet a ‘no 
bailout’ obligation cannot be said to have any demonstrable effect 
until a crisis comes along to test it. Indeed, the ‘no bailout’ principle 
failed to warn off the financial markets from underappreciating the 
real possibility of sovereign default, where the terms of Euro-
denominated debt largely converged without regard to the marked 
difference in credit-worthiness of the various Eurozone member 
states.24 
To some degree, the declared ‘no bailout’ policy was an EMU 
afterthought, a piece of window dressing to allay worst-case concerns. 
While Europe had experienced devaluations during its post-World 
War II experience, it had not suffered a sovereign default. But the 
Euro introduced the possibility of a new kind of sovereign default - 
one involving a country’s official currency, yet a currency the debtor 
state does not and cannot control. In typical sovereign default 
scenarios, the debtor is unable to service its external debt, expressed 
in a harder currency it cannot control. Internal borrowings create less 
of an obstacle, as the borrowing state can simply monetize the internal 
debt through issuance of additional units of national currency. 
For budgetary purposes, the Euro functions as an external 
currency for each Eurozone member state. They no longer maintain 
the possibility of running the printing press or engaging in a 
devaluation. Sooner or later, member state budgets must balance. But 
                                                                                                                                     
23.  See Pringle v. Ireland, Case C-370/12, [2012] ECR I (2012). In Pringle, the CJEU 
characterized TFEU Article 125 as “essentially preventive,” whereas the ESM would operate 
in “the management of financial crises which, notwithstanding such preventive action as might 
have been taken, might nonetheless arise.” Id. ¶59. The Court does not seem to appreciate that 
‘no bailout’ is negative action. 
24.  See Jay Shambaugh, The Euro’s Three Crises, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY, Spring 2012. See also Christian Odendahl, Insight, The Eurozone’s Real Interest 
Rate Problem, CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN REFORM, July 8, 2014, http://www.cer.org.uk/insights/
eurozones-real-interest-rate-problem. 
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linked to this hard reality was the new possibility to borrow Euros at 
rates comparable to those offered to Germany. The markets, for 
whatever reason, were eager to make Euro-denominated loans. Easy 
money presented the temptation to finance budget losses that proved 
irresistible to several Eurozone member states. 
The markets viewed Spain like the Netherlands, Greece like 
Germany - at least in terms of the interest rate charged for sovereign 
debt. How could the markets be so wrong? It may have been, of 
course, that the budgetary divergence among Eurozone member states 
did not in and of itself represent any meaningful risk of default given 
the bullish launch of the Euro. 
Nor were member states unappreciative of the loss of 
macroeconomic tools joining the EMU entailed. For this and other 
reasons, they clutched to their retained sovereignty in fiscal affairs. 
And ultimately, each Eurozone member was left to its own devices. 
‘No bailout’ goes hand in hand with the retention of sovereign fiscal 
discretion. The EMU formed on the smashing success of the 
reunification of Germany - and the substitution of the hard 
Deutschmark for its East German counterpart. 25  The German 
experience may have led the founders to an underappreciation of new 
risks introduced by the EMU experiment. 
In all events, the prospect of sovereign default must have seemed 
distant at the time of the Euro launch. Certainly, there was little 
perceived need for a coordinated response to a Eurozone member 
state default. A concern for introducing moral hazard discouraged any 
hint of tolerance for the kind of troubles that came to visit the 
Eurozone from 2009. The policy of no bailouts is a policy attempting 
to contain moral hazard - but there are practical limits to eliminating 
moral hazard. So long as there is a collective interest in play, any 
single member state is exposed to moral hazard, notwithstanding 
solemn declarations (such as TFEU Article 125) to the contrary. For 
all intents and purposes the policy approach adopted by the Eurozone 
was one of prevention, as opposed to a post-bailout mop up. 
The convergence criteria had already been applied to the 
prospective Eurozone member states as they approached Stage III. 
Their overall indebtedness of prospective Euro adopters was to be 
reduced below 60% of GDP and their annual budgets were not to 
                                                                                                                                     
25.  See Peter Bofinger, The German Monetary Unification (GMU): Converting Marks 
to D-Marks, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, July/August 1990. 
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exceed 3% of GDP. It is important to note that these criteria were 
originally convergence criteria, and not (at least in their first 
incarnation) intended to serve as ongoing fiscal targets. And the 
choice of the 60% and 3% targets were conceded to be arbitrary.26 
The fiscal discipline these numerical criteria exerted was given a 
permanent, post-convergence role by the Stability and Growth Pact. 
It is hard to imagine that a member state that scrupulously 
followed the criteria laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact could 
ever find itself at risk of default and in need of a bailout. Indeed, 
under certain growth assumptions, maintaining budget deficits below 
3% would eliminate overall indebtedness in fairly short order, which 
might neither be appropriate nor desirable.27 Yet not all Eurozone 
member states proved to be so scrupulous. For complex reasons, it 
was the larger member states, including Germany, which appeared to 
have the greatest difficulties in applying budgetary discipline.28 
II. 2005 STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT REFORMS 
The run-up to the launch of the Euro involved no little disregard 
for the convergence criteria that had to be met by each prospective 
Euro member state.29 Rather than confining the Euro to the strongest 
economies - those countries whose political climate and structural 
characteristics best fit the sought after ‘hard’ macroeconomic policies 
- the Euro was intended to reach the greater part of the European 
Union as it then existed30 (the United Kingdom and Denmark were 
permitted to opt out,31 and Sweden’s unilateral decision to stay away 
from the Euro has never been challenged).32 In the end, all but one of 
                                                                                                                                     
26.  See Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth, supra note 3, at 
1279-80 (“[T]he leading Belgian economist Paul de Grawe flatly states that using the 3% 
figure as a limit for the budget deficits ‘has no valid scientific basis.’”). 
27.  See Paul De Grauwe, The Stability and Growth Pact in Need of Reform, (University 
of Leuven, Working Paper, 2003). 
28.  See A very European crisis: The sorry state of Greece’s public finances is a test not 
only for the country’s policymakers but also for Europe’s, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 2010. 
29.  See Paul De Grauwe, The Politics of the Maastricht convergence criteria, in VOX – 
CEPR’S POLICY PORTAL, Apr. 15, 2009. 
30.  See European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, One Currency For 
One Europe: The Road to the Euro (2015), http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/
general/pdf/the_road_to_euro_en.pdf. 
31.  See European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, The Euro: Who Can 
Join and When?, (May 15,2015), http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/adoption/who_
can_join/index_en.htm. 
32.  See id. 
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the then EU member states seeking to adopt the Euro were deemed to 
have met the convergence criteria. Only Greece failed to qualify - and 
it too joined the Eurozone merely one year later.33 
In fact, the desired convergence, as measured by the 60% of 
GDP upper limit on debt and the 3% budget deficit cap, had not been 
obtained by several member states. For some, nominal compliance 
with the convergence criteria resulted from a combination of 
accounting tricks and outright looking away.34 
To some degree, achievement of fiscal convergence was 
accepted as a matter à faire. After all, the very same targets were 
hardwired into the Stability and Growth Pact. So long as the Eurozone 
member states were approaching the targets at the time of the Euro 
launch, it might not be far-fetched to imagine that they would meet 
and maintain the target convergence in short order. 
And so the Euro was launched, with the Stability and Growth 
Pact functioning as the central mechanism for fiscal coordination. The 
early experience was favorable. 35  The Stability and Growth Pact 
featured an elaborate compliance mechanism. All EU member states - 
not simply the Eurozone states - were to subject national budgeting to 
review by the Commission.36 Failure to make the targets triggered 
intense review and the possibility of Council-approved financial 
penalties for non-compliance. 37  It was thought that national 
governments would not stray far from the Stability and Growth Pact 
targets because - given the prospect of discipline - it would simply be 
too expensive to do so.38 
                                                                                                                                     
33.  See Jennifer Rankin, Greece in Europe: A Short History, GUARDIAN, July 3, 2015. 
Greece has been a Eurozone member since January 1, 2001. European Commission, Economic 
and Financial Affairs, Greece and the Euro (May 4, 2009). 
34.  See Allan Little, How ‘Magic’ Made Greek Debt Disappear Before it Joined the 
Euro, BBC NEWS, Feb. 3, 2012. 
35.  See Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth, supra note 3 at 
1286-89. 
36.   See European Commission Press Release MEMO/15/6071, European Commission 
– Fact Sheet: The EU’s Economic Governance Explained, (Nov. 26, 2015), http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6071_en.htm. 
37.  See id. 
38.  In fact, the early perception of favorable operation of the Stability and Growth Pact 
may have been due to the happenstance of benign economic times when, for most Eurozone 
member states, achieving the targets came easily. In retrospect, there was likely an 
underappreciation of the pro-cyclical nature of the system. That is, Eurozone member states 
failed to use ‘good times’ to make structural reforms and/or aggressively reduce indebtedness. 
2016] FROM 'NO BAILOUT' TO THE ESM 1211 
All this broke down dramatically in 2004 as both France and 
Germany veered into recession. 39  In both cases, the national 
government engaged in deficit spending beyond the margin permitted 
by the Stability and Growth Pact. The Commission took action to 
sanction France40  and Germany41  - but France and Germany used 
their seats on the Council to block the imposition of the enforcement 
phase of the Stability and Growth Pact.42 
The Commission brought the Council before the Court of Justice 
for its failure to act.43 In a “Solomonic” judgment,44 the Court upheld 
the inherently discretionary role the Council exercised under the 
Stability and Growth Pact (and thus acquitted the Council for its 
actions in this instance). The Court did, however, suggest that there 
might be situations where a failure to act by the Council might be 
actionable.45 
As a political matter, the Stability and Growth Pact was a dead 
letter. If it failed to check Germany - a state with a long-standing 
tradition of hard currency policy - in times of economic stress, it was 
hard to imagine that it could be fairly applied to any other member 
State. In the words of Commission President Prodi, the Stability and 
Growth Pact was “stupid.”46 The position of the affected member 
states was that the budget criterion - the 3% deficit cap - was too 
inflexible.47 
                                                                                                                                     
39.  See Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth, supra note 3, at 
1289. 
40 .  The Commission recommended on October 21, 2003 that the Council should 
sanction France for its failure to take effective action to reduce its deficits. See European 
Commission, Recommendation for a Council Decision giving notice to France, Oct. 21, 2003. 
41.  The Commission recommended on November 18, 2003 that the Council should 
sanction Greece for its failure to take effective action to reduce its deficits. See European 
Commission, Recommendation for a Council Decision giving notice to Germany, Nov. 18, 
2003. 
42.  At its November 25, 2003 meeting, France and Germany blocked Ecofin Council 
action that would have endorsed the Commission’s findings. See Goebel, Should Fiscal 
Stability Outweigh Economic Growth, supra note 3, at 1325-29. 
43.  See id. at 1329-30. 
44.  According to Roger Goebel, the Court’s judgment was “Solomonic” as it permitted 
both the Commission and the Council to claim a victory on certain issues. Id., at 1336. 
45.  See Commission v. Council (Stability and Growth Pact), Case C-27/04, [2004] 
E.C.R. I-6649. See also Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth, supra 
note 3, at 1329-40. 
46.  Elaine Sciolino, An Italian Official’s Blunt Words Set Off Euro-Mayhem, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2002. 
47.  European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, Policy and surveillance, 
The corrective arm, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/
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In the aftermath of the CJEU’s decision, the Commission 
adopted a conciliatory attitude, proposing a series of reforms to the 
Stability and Growth Pact.48 These involved introducing the missing 
flexibility by expanding the situations where the budget deficit cap 
could be relaxed.49 
In 2005, the Stability and Growth Pact was “reformed” through 
amendments of the Multilateral Surveillance Regulation and the 
Excessive Deficit Regulation. The Stability and Growth Pact as 
reformed retained the 3% and 60% targets, however. The European 
Union remained committed to fiscal coordination; arguably its resolve 
was ever stronger given the newly engineered flexibility. The 
statistical capacity of both the national budget offices and the 
Commission in conducting oversight was increased.50 
It would turn out, however, that the reforms to the SGP and 
enhanced oversight of Eurozone member state budgeting were not 
sufficient to prevent Greece’s massive understatement of the budget 
deficit. Greece smashed through the SGP’s budgetary and 
accumulated debt ceilings in such a surprising manner (the surprise of 
course a result of the expectation induced by the presence of the 
reformed Stability and Growth Pact), that the financial markets were 
shaken. And so things proceeded from bad to worse, as Greece saw its 
funding costs escalate, its access to borrowing decline, and its real 
economy tumble away. 
III. GREEK DEBACLE TO EURO CRISIS 
The scale of the hidden Greek deficits shocked market and 
Eurozone political leaders to the core. 51  More importantly, the 
member state established in the public’s mind (particularly in the 
German public’s mind) an image of a wasteful, irresponsible Greece, 
enjoying the good life managed by favored Euro-borrowings. To 
                                                                                                                                     
corrective_arm/index_en.htm. See also European Parliament, Debates, Stability and Growth 
Pact, Sept. 15, 2004, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+
CRE+20040915+ITEM-006+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
48 .  See Amy Filpek & Till Schreiber, The Stability and Growth Pact: Past 
Performance and Future Reforms, (College of William and Mary Department of Economics, 
Working Paper No. 97, 2010). 
49.  See id. 
50.  See Goebel, Should Fiscal Stability Outweigh Economic Growth, supra note 3, at 
1347-50. 
51.  The revised 2009 Greek budget anticipated a deficit of 12.7% of GDP; the prior 
forecast had been 6.0%. See Lane, The European Sovereign Debt Crisis, supra note 1, at 36. 
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some degree, there were grounds for this belief that Greece was living 
beyond its means. Its pensions, it became known, were extremely 
liberal (a public employee could retire to full pension at the age of 
sixty-one). 52  And Greece was notoriously derelict in collecting 
taxes; 53  in fact, the Greek state may have been complicit in the 
widespread tax evasion that pushed its budget deeply into the red. 
That said, the root cause of the deficits in Greece and the other 
peripheral Eurozone member states may have had systematic causes 
beyond the control of their respective governments.54 
The budget deficit was run up by one Greek government; its 
existence was revealed by the successor government led by George A. 
Papandreou. 55  There was, no doubt, some internal political 
scorekeeping. But the turn of government did seem to restore at least 
some possibility of Greece’s return to fiscal prudence. 
From the perspective of Greece’s Eurozone partners, its behavior 
was doubly reprehensible: running up the deficit itself, followed by 
the deliberate effort of keeping it hidden. But the budget deficit may 
have been a thoroughly understandable response to irresistible 
internal forces. Greece was engaged in democratic government; in 
running up the deficits, the Greek government was responding to 
domestic political pressures. It may well have been that the 
democratic ‘cost’ of adopting the Euro had been understated. The 
subsequent Greek revulsion to the austerity program imposed as a 
condition of the Greek bailout suggests that the expectations of the 
Greek people of their government may have exceeded what the 
Stability and Growth Pact permitted. 
Greece, like other Eurozone member states, faced structural 
obligations that were resistant to budgetary cuts. Again, Greek public 
pensions were quite generous (and tellingly more generous than their 
German counterparts).56 Greece also has a heritage of extremely high 
                                                                                                                                     
52.  See Kate Connolly, Greek debt crisis: the view from Germany, GUARDIAN, Feb. 11, 
2010. 
53.  See Adea Guillot, Greece struggles to address its tax evasion problem, GUARDIAN, 
Feb. 24, 2015; see also Mike Bird, This is the real reason Greece has a massive tax-evasion 
problem, BUSINESS INSIDER, Feb. 25, 2015. 
54.  According to Lane, the “political narrative of the crisis . . . laid the primary blame 
on the fiscal irresponsibility of the peripheral nations, even though the underlying financial and 
macroeconomic imbalances were more important factors.” Lane, The European Sovereign 
Debt Crisis, supra note 1, at 56. 
55.  See Mahmud, supra note 11, at 639. 
56 .  See What makes Germans so very cross about Greece?- Greece’s Generous 
Pensions, ECONOMIST, Feb. 23, 2010. 
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military expenditure as part of its frontline NATO role during the 
Cold War.57 And Greece faced some dismal demographics: an aging 
population, high levels of unemployment, and outward migration of 
the young and ambitious.58 That Greece was out of compliance was 
an open secret for many years - and here the EU oversight (or lack 
thereof) might be described as enabling. Turning a blind eye to Greek 
noncompliance was important to maintaining the overall perception 
that all was well in the Eurozone. 
The convergence of interest rates prior to the Greek revelations 
suggested that the financial markets viewed all Eurozone member 
state obligations as posing substantially the same risk. Interest rate 
convergence in itself does not establish that the market had perceived 
all Eurozone sovereign debt to have the same level of primary risk; 
rather, there seems to have been a widely shared perception that, 
notwithstanding the presence of TFEU Article 125 (the ‘no bailout’ 
provision), the Eurozone would intervene to prevent the occurrence of 
any credit event. It was not the existence of the deficits that shocked 
the markets upon their revelation, but their magnitude. Things were 
bad enough to quickly present the possibility of default - something 
that had simply not been imagined. 
The ECB59 and the German political leadership,60 by word and 
by inaction, quickly educated the financial market that this would not 
be the case, and huge gaps developed between the borrowing costs 
facing Greece and certain other Eurozone states and the German 
benchmark.61 
The painfully long period of non-response by EU and Eurozone 
officialdom brought two scenarios to the forefront. The first was the 
possibility of a sovereign default, which was easy enough to imagine 
in the case of Greece. The second was the exit of Greece from the 
Eurozone. Presumably this would involve an awkward reintroduction 
of the drachma - with the result that Greek sovereign obligations that 
                                                                                                                                     
57.  See Marina Skordeli, The Way Forward: Sixty years from the accession of Greece 
and Turkey to NATO, NATO REVIEW MAGAZINE, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/
turkey-greece/greece-turkey-60-years-nato/en/index.htm. 
58.  See Nikos Konstandaras, Greece’s Dismal Demographics, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 
2013. 
59.  See Mahmud, supra note 11, at 640 (“The ECB reiterated its no special-treatment 
posture and reminded Greece that ‘it ha[d] to catch up on its homework’” (citing Europe 
Markets Rise Amid Rumors on Deals, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2010))). 
60.  See Mahmud, supra note 11, at 642. 
61.  See id. at 640. 
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were originally expressed in Euros would become payable in the 
newly re-established, greatly devalued, domestic currency. 
It is the second scenario - exit from the Euro - that likely created 
the greater amount of contagion. If Greece could leave the Euro, so 
could any other Eurozone member state grasping to devalue its Euro-
denominated indebtedness. Investors holding Euro-denominated 
bonds could imagine them converted to pesetas or Irish pounds or lire 
- and that would be a financial horror. In fact, a Greek exit might well 
have led to a total collapse of the Euro. The very idea of this ‘created’ 
shadow national currencies, with shadow interest rates reflecting the 
variance in risk. 
A mix of contagion (justified or not) and objective economic 
weakness plunged other Eurozone member states into crisis. Portugal, 
Italy, Ireland, and Spain joined Greece in facing large spikes in 
interest rates, a drying up of liquidity, and a resultant fall of their real 
economies into crisis. 
IV. 2012 GREEK BAILOUT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 
EFSF & EFSM 
There was a long period between the initial recognition of the 
dire straits Greece found itself in and the May 2012 bailout. On the 
part of the Eurozone member states - and the larger European Union 
as well - the initial response was to hope the Greek problem would go 
away. This was not a simple matter of indifference. There was no 
ready-made political constituency supporting a bailout. A Greek 
bailout would violate the clear ‘no bailout’ principle enshrined in the 
Treaty. Article 125 may never have been intended to serve as a real 
legal check on member state action, but it did express a political 
undertaking that was sold to the European people, especially the 
German people who abandoned their revered Deutschmark for the 
unknowns of the Euro. 
And the Greeks did little to engender sympathy during this 
period. Revelations of abuses (of a kind that likely could be found in 
many states) drove moralizing responses: the Greeks, it seemed to 
right-thinking Germans, deserved to be left to their fates.62 
                                                                                                                                     
62.  At one point, German politicians suggested that Greece might close their budget 
deficits by “selling off some of their lovely islands.” Id. at 645. 
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The Greeks resisted, both before and after the May 2012 bailout, 
the imposition of austerity terms.63 An initial bailout was precluded 
when the Greek government unexpectedly scheduled a referendum to 
approve its terms, including acceptance of the required 
conditionality.64 At no point did Greece appear penitent for its non-
compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact. This reciprocal 
aversion to addressing the problem further enhanced the perception 
that Greece would have to leave the Euro.65 And this increased the 
contagion now afflicting other Eurozone member states. 
In the end, a “troika” comprising the IMF, the European Union, 
and the European Central Bank put together an ad hoc and quite 
complex bailout package that Greece was willing to accept. The 
bailout included “private sector involvement,” 66  also known as 
haircuts, where private investors of Greek obligations would 
exchange these for new obligations of much less value. Ironically, a 
considerable amount of Greek debt was held by foreign private 
creditors;67 any bailout funded in part by Germany would flow into 
and out of Greece’s hands to partially satisfy these creditors. The 
awareness that any bailout would benefit private debt holders drove 
the insistence on the inclusion of severe haircuts in the bailout. 
Notwithstanding the haircuts, the bailout did not reduce the overall 
indebtedness of Greece, although it did effectively shift the mix of 
debt from what had been largely private in character to one in which 
most debt would be held by public institutions.68 
Moreover, the bailout imposed conditionality on Greek 
management of its economy.69 This in turn led to popular resistance in 
Greece and elsewhere in the European Union as austerity policies 
were applied in response to the Euro crisis. Austerity was viewed as 
                                                                                                                                     
63.  Three people died in May 2010 during violent protests in Athens. See id. at 649. 
64 .  See Daniel Harari, Briefing Paper 7114, Greek debt crisis: background and 
developments in 2015, HOUSE OF COMMONS, Oct. 13, 2015. 
65.  Chancellor Merkel raised the possibility that Greece might be excluded from the 
Eurozone. See Mahmud, supra note 11, at 645. 
66.  Nouriel Roubini, Greece’s Private Creditors are the Lucky Ones, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f0f0708e-679d-11e1-b6a1-00144feabdc0.html#
axzz46WIvkgbF. 
67.   See Mahmud, supra note 11, at 651. 
68.  See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE EUROZONE CRISIS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR 
CONGRESS (2012). 
69 . See Greece’s Debt Crisis Explained, NY TIMES, (Nov. 9, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/business/international/greece-debt-crisis-
euro.html?_r=0. 
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both antidemocratic and punitive.70 As such, conditionality touched 
off a renewed debate about the proper role of the state in providing 
needed social services. 
The Greek bailout provided a historical demonstration of what 
the response of the Eurozone to a financial crisis of one of its member 
states would entail. It put to rest the notion that a rigorous ‘no bailout’ 
policy would be applied in such event. Rather, bailout (and further 
bailout) appeared to be the appropriate prescription. 
The Greek bailout (and on-going support), as well as the 
financial assistance provided to Ireland and Spain, have reduced 
concerns of any particular member state leaving the Eurozone. The 
once-predicted collapse of the Euro 71  has been postponed. The 
markets seem to have swallowed this; once again, interest rates 
applied to various Eurozone member states on the sovereign 
borrowings have converged. 
The ad hoc Greek bailout was followed by the establishment of 
two ‘temporary’ facilities to provide assistance to struggling 
Eurozone member states: the European Financial Stability Facility 
(“EFSF”) 72  and the European Financial Stability Mechanism 
(“EFSM”.)73 While both of these facilities have been drawn on, their 
establishment was not tied to any particular bailout. Together, they 
operated to bolster creditor confidence beyond the specific member 
states’ beneficiaries of their financial assistance. 
The two facilities were backed by guarantees from the 
participating Eurozone member states.74  They were able to access 
                                                                                                                                     
70.  See Christina Schweiger, Progressive Politics: Permanent Austerity Stranglehold?, 
SOCIAL EUROPE, May 29, 2015, https://www.socialeurope.eu/2015/05/progressive-politics-
permanent-austerity-stranglehold/. 
71.  Famously, Paul Krugman, Nobel laureate and columnist of the New York Times, 
warned of the collapse of the Euro. See Paul Krugman, Euro Zone Death Trip, NY TIMES, 
(Sept. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/opinion/euro-zone-death-trip.html. 
72. See European Financial Stability Facility, About EFSF (2016), 
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm. 
73.  The EFSM was created on June 7, 2010. It was engaged on November 28, 2010 to 
provide €85 billion of assistance to Ireland and on May 17, 2011 to provide €78 billion to 
Portugal. The EFSM provided €139.9 billion of follow up financial assistance to Greece in 
2012. European Stability Mechanism, European Financial Stability Facility & European 
Stability Mechanism, May 2014. See also Boris Ryvkin, Saving the Euro: Tensions with 
European Treaty Law in the European Union’s Efforts to Protect the Common Currency, 45 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 227 (2012) at 240-45. 
74.  Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, all recipients of bailout funds, withdrew their 
respective guarantees from the EFSM. See European Stability Mechanism, European Financial 
Stability Facility & European Stability Mechanism, May 2014. 
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funds from the capital markets. While they have been replaced in 
some sense by the ‘permanent’ European Stability Mechanism, the 
EFSF at least will be with us for a long time, 75  as it services 
outstanding loans. 
V. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ESM 
The EFSF and EFSM served their purposes, providing needed 
funding to Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Cyprus.76 Moreover, 
their very presence assured holders of sovereign obligations issued by 
other troubled Eurozone member states. But they were designed to be, 
and were limited to, the particular financial crisis that inspired their 
creation. They were, frankly, of some constitutional dubiousness, 
given the presence of Article 125, the ‘no bailout’ clause, and the 
possible impermissible delegation of exclusive EU powers. 
The decision was taken to construct a permanent facility, the 
European Stability Mechanism, to be built on a fairly firm 
constitutional foundation,77 and to increase investor confidence in the 
performance of Eurozone member states going forward. 
The permanent European Stability Mechanism was established 
following the October 28-29, 2010 meeting of the European 
Council.78 The ESM replaced the ad hoc Greek bailout facility, as 
well as the temporary (though more general purpose) EFSM and 
EFSF. Soon after launch, the ESM provided EU€41.3 billion in 
financial assistance to Spain to provide for the recapitalization of the 
Spanish banking sector79 and provided EU€4.75 billion in assistance 
to Cyprus in 2013.80 
Establishing the ESM required an amendment to the TFEU 
authorizing the Eurozone member states to enter into a stand-alone 
                                                                                                                                     
75 .  See European Stability Mechanism: Synopsis from the European Commission, 
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treaty.81 The European Council anticipated resort to the simplified 
revision procedure82 in order to add a new provision to TFEU Article 
136. Whether use of the revision procedure had been appropriate was 
tested in the Pringle case, 83  a challenge brought by an Irish 
parliamentarian who opposed the ESM. The CJEU upheld the use of 
the simplified procedure, stressing that resorting to the ESM did not 
constitute an improper delegation of monetary authority, given that 
the ESM would only be activated to safeguard the stability of the 
Eurozone as a whole and that financial assistance would be subject to 
strict conditionality.84 These two limits - the necessary presence of a 
threat to wider Eurozone stability and application of strict 
conditionality - are set out in the revised TFEU Article 136.85 
The European Stability Mechanism entered into force on July 1, 
2013.86 The ESM is directed by a Board of Governors comprising the 
finance ministers of the Eurozone member states.87 The President of 
the European Central Bank and the EU Commissioner for Economic 
and Monetary Affairs have observer status.88 Major decisions of the 
ESM - including the grant of financial assistance - are to be taken by 
“mutual agreement,” which is defined as unanimity of those member 
states voting.89 
Both the ECB and the IMF will liaise with the ESM to determine 
the existence of a threat to the financial stability of the Eurozone as a 
                                                                                                                                     
81 .   See ARTICLE 136 TFEU, ESM, FISCAL STABILITY TREATY – RATIFICATION 
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Democracy, 14 GERMAN L. J. 169. 
85.  See ARTICLE 136 TFEU RATIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 81. 
86. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM, (2011), 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/art2_mb201107en_pp71-84en.pdf. 
87.  See id. 
88.  See id. 
89.  See id. 
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whole. 90  This mechanism will operate to temper the political 
discretion to dismiss what is intended to be a significant check on the 
ESM’s bailout capacity - and so should reduce moral hazard 
concerns. The ECB and the IMF will likely contribute to the 
stipulation of financial adjustment policies needed to satisfy the 
conditionality of any assistance to a troubled member state.91 
The terms of eventual financial assistance will be tailored to the 
situation at hand with regard to loan maturity and whether interest 
will be fixed or variable. 92  Pricing will start at 200 basis points, 
increasing by an additional 100 basis points for any amounts 
outstanding after three years. 93  The pricing is said to be non-
concessionary; that is, sufficiently adverse to discourage any 
permanent recourse by a troubled member state.94 The ample margins 
are also intended to compensate the risk undertaken by the ultimate 
providers of the ESM’s funding. 
The ESM will also have the power to intervene in the secondary 
market for bonds issued by the troubled Eurozone member state.95 
Exercise of this capacity would relieve the ECB from undertaking 
similar actions.96 
The twin requirements - threat to Eurozone stability and 
application of strict conditionality - imply that a Eurozone member 
state may find itself in dire straits without meaningful access to ESM 
assistance (and by implication, to assistance of any other kind). One 
assumes that the Greece scenario would satisfy the threat to the 
stability of the Eurozone as a whole test, but one cannot be sure. 
Greece is a very small economy, but, as events demonstrated, its 
default generated contagion and challenged structural notions about 
the solidarity of the Euro compact. Still, an extremely irresponsible 
member state (which might fit Greece) floundering in what otherwise 
might be healthy times for the Eurozone as a whole might find itself 
with no hope of rescue. But perhaps this is precisely the dose of 
worst-case consideration that operates to reduce moral hazard. 
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The ESM includes EU€700 billion of paid in and callable capital 
drawn from the Eurozone member states, which is thought to be 
adequate to provide for EU€500 billion of lending capacity.97 The 
ESM is also authorized to raise funds on the capital markets by 
issuing its own securities.98 The mix of paid in and callable capital is 
designed to operate as a further brake on the offer of financial 
assistance; sponsoring Eurozone member states might well hesitate to 
approve a bailout if it has the consequence of drawing resources 
during a time of general financial stress.99 Of course, this is precisely 
the scenario where financial assistance is likely to be needed. It 
remains to be seen how the markets will view debt issued by the 
ESM. The ESM is a European institution with a distinct legal 
personality; as such, its commitments do not involve any commitment 
from the Eurozone member states that stand behind it. 
The Stability and Growth Pact received a substantial reworking 
in the aftermath of the Euro crisis. A new intergovernmental treaty 
among participating EU member states, the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance, known as the Fiscal Compact, was 
signed on March 2, 2012, and came into effect for the initial sixteen 
member states completing ratification on January 1, 2013.100 Certain 
obligations of the Fiscal Compact apply to certain EU member states 
outside the Eurozone. Article 3(2) of the Fiscal Compact imposes the 
obligation on signatory states to transpose the balanced budget rules 
into national legislation within one year of its entry into force.101 
CONCLUSION 
The Maastricht design for monetary union was bold, if not 
reckless. It had not been lost on many political and economic 
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13, 2012), https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2012/03/2012-03-14-esm-
gesetze.html. 
98 .  See CREDIT SUISSE, ESM: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS IN EUROPEAN SSAS – 
EXPLORER, FIXED INCOME RESEARCH (2012), https://doc.research-and-analytics.csfb.com/
docView?language=ENG&format=PDF&source=em&document_id=1002045321&serialid=Y
iV93D198UryyTOfk5ytJk5BlEQZtjoMMyHxl6%2fHtqo%3d. 
99.  See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE EUROZONE CRISIS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR 
CONGRESS (Sep. 26, 2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42377.pdf. 
100.  The Fiscal Compact has now been ratified by all 25 signatory states (all EU 
member states but Croatia, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom). See Article 136 
TFEU, supra note 81. 
101. See Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, supra note 5. 
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observers, if not the creators of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union, that the design was incomplete. Yes, there would be monetary 
union for most EU member states, a new common currency would be 
adopted, and monetary policy would be transferred to a central 
authority (what has become the European Central Bank). But left 
incomplete was any transfer of fiscal sovereignty by any member 
state. Taxation and social benefits were (and continue to be) matters 
of national determination; the decisions when and how member state 
budgets would run into deficits were only loosely coordinated. The 
Euro experiment has tested whether a group of countries could 
operate a monetary union without fiscal union. There was enough 
hope that a felicitous combination of growth and economic 
convergence would make the plan work. In retrospect, they and we 
should have known better. 
The post-Maastricht treaty imposed certain budgetary 
expectations: budgets should balance in the medium term and there 
would be no bailouts of a member state. In other words, there wasn’t 
much structure to inhibit a Greece (or an Ireland or a Portugal) from 
getting into the trouble they later encountered. 
One wonders: were the EMU designers simply irresponsibly 
optimistic (the Naive Theory) or did they engineer a structure they 
realized was prone to collapse in the belief that inevitable crisis would 
force deeper fiscal integration (the Cynical Theory)? 
The first Stability and Growth Pact was an afterthought - 
implemented as the greater number of EU member states approached 
Stage III of the monetary union. It provided both ex ante and ex post 
controls on Eurozone member states’ budgets. The elaborate vetting 
of national budgetary plans by EU institutions, and the attendant 
transparency, contributes to budgetary discipline; it cannot, however, 
prevent the occurrence of deficits in the event that assumptions are 
not realized. The ex post controls stipulated by the First Stability and 
Growth Pact broke down: the Council’s reluctance to impose 
sanctions on Germany and France, which had excessive deficits 
during a period of economic slowdown, led to the effective death of 
the First SGP and the follow-on reforms. But it had never been clear 
what was gained by imposing a financial penalty on a country that 
was already running a budget deficit. 
The reformed Stability and Growth Pact created more discretion 
to manage economic stress, at least with regard to ex post sanctions, 
but it is not clear if this was much of an improvement over the initial 
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SGP. In any event, the reformed Stability and Growth Pact did little to 
prevent the series of catastrophes that characterized the Euro crisis. 
The collapse of Greece, the follow-on contagion to other weakened 
member states, the unravelling of the market’s expectation of 
Eurozone solidarity, and the property crashes in Ireland, Spain, and 
Portugal were more than the monetary union could sustain. A bailout, 
of course, is a one-off fiscal transfer; to have a bailout program, either 
unstated or institutionalized (as is now the case under the European 
Stability Mechanism) is to have at least a residual Eurozone fiscal 
policy. 
The ESM may still be a stop-gap, in that deeper, formal fiscal 
integration may be needed to save the Euro (and perhaps the 
European Union). At this writing, it is difficult to see the next steps. 
The EU is currently threatened with the impending withdrawal of the 
United Kingdom, following the June 2016 Brexit referendum.102 The 
UK departure might create conditions for greater fiscal coordination 
among the remaining EU membership. Or it might push the European 
Union into a broader collapse. The European Union as a single market 
was a remarkably stable enterprise; the Eurozone as a monetary union 
has been far less so. The Cynical Theory might be right: crisis and 
demonstrated dysfunction might create the political conditions, years 
after the launch of the Euro, for the fiscal coordination needed to 
sustain a common currency. 
In any event, the European Stability Mechanism is at work - 
even if it has never been called on to provide financial assistance. 
There remains a sizable stock of Eurozone indebtedness owed to the 
EFSF; it is still too early to declare the Euro crisis behind us. But now 
and going forward, the financial markets can read the presence of the 
ESM as some level guarantee for Euro-denominated debt issued by 
Eurozone member states. The markets can also rest assured that the 
strict ‘no bailout’ policy has been abandoned (although of course 
Article 125 remains in the TFEU). 
The Euro crisis has exposed the fact that in broad parts of 
Europe there is no consensus that budget deficits should not be 
tolerated. Indeed, the German antipathy to budget deficits (rooted in 
German experience) is not widely shared. Post-crisis austerity 
triggered hostile opposition. Many Europeans prefer their familiar 
                                                                                                                                     
102.  See Brian Wheeler & Alex Hunt, Brexit: All you need to know about the UK 
leaving the EU, BBC NEWS (July 21, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887. 
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safety nets, and will support deficits to keep them in place. Attitudinal 
(that is, political) convergence is more difficult to achieve – given the 
absence of consensus among national leaders (let alone Commission 
technocrats) on the degree of budgetary discipline needed to maintain 
the Euro. 
